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A Perspective on the Houston Economy
This edition of Houston Business marks
our 81
st issue and the beginning of our
11
th year of publication. Throughout the
past decade of publishing this newsletter,
we have looked at Houston from many
perspectives, almost always in short,
bite-sized essays. The relationship
between oil and the local economy has
been a recurring theme in many of
these articles and is often poorly
understood even by those of us who live
here. This article is an attempt to
summarize what we have learned about
Houston, oil and oil’s effect on the local
economy. We have freely used
information from past articles with the
goal of making a more coherent
statement here than the shorter pieces








































































Oil and the Houston 
Economy Today
In early 1987, Houston began a rapid and
decisive climb back from the oil bust. In the
nearly 13 years since that turnaround, the city has
added 680,000 jobs, a 49 percent expansion. Many
of these new jobs were drawn from health care,
aerospace and an array of companies outside the
oil business. But, to the surprise of all, the often-
battered oil industry played an important role in
Houston’s economic recovery. It also helped
shape the new Houston economy that emerged in
the 1990s. 
Houston has become the centerpiece of a re-
invigorated and profitable American oil industry.
Although still highly cyclical, today’s U.S. oil
exploration and production industry is financially
healthy, technology-driven and increasingly
focused on international operations. Further, the
seemingly mundane business of processing oil—
turning it into gasoline or plastics—has brought
tens of thousands of new jobs to Houston’s chem-
ical, construction and engineering industries. Oil
still counts in Houston, directly and indirectly sup-
porting over half the city’s 2 million jobs, and it
remains a key factor in the city’s business cycle as
well. 
This article looks at the role of oil and natural
gas in Houston today, particularly at how this
commodity-driven industry affects local economic
conditions. On the one hand, it is impossible to
ignore the very large role oil continues to play in
Houston. On the other hand, the memory of
Houston’s devastated economy in the 1980s per-
petuates distrust of oil—a fear that relying on oil
will lead to another massive downturn. Now, well
over a decade after the oil bust ended, industrial diversification still moves to the top of the
agenda when the local economy is discussed. 
As we look at the relative stability of the
1990s, we can point to diversification of the
city’s economic base, to better balance
between upstream and downstream oil, and to
the stabilizing effects of the consolidation into
Houston of large, new headquarters facilities.
But the key difference between the 1980s and
1990s is probably simple to define: an absence
of speculative excesses. A leaner, smarter oil
industry is unlikely to again suffer the kind of
setback it experienced in the 1980s. Without
the excesses that drove the industry—and ulti-
mately drove the local economy—in the
1980s, Houston seems safe from a repeat dis-
aster. 
BOOM, BUST AND RECOVERY
In early 1982, it seemed Houston had
solved the riddle of the American business
cycle—and the secret was an economy based
on oil. While the United States slipped in and
out of eight recessions after World War II,
Houston enjoyed 40 years of uninterrupted
growth that quadrupled the city’s population
from 627,000 in 1940 to 2.7 million in 1980. 
Houston’s economic success formula
seemed infallible at the time. An oil price spike
had taken place shortly before nearly every
post-War recession in the United States, with
the oil shocks sharing in the blame for these
broad economic contractions. The explanation
for the oil price spikes differed from one reces-
sion to the next: the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion, refinery strikes, war in the Middle East or
the OPEC cartel. But in Houston, the bottom
line remained the same with each recession:
higher energy prices gave the city’s oil-driven
economy a timely boost and carried it through
the downturn. As recession passed, U.S.
demand would strengthen for crude oil and
refined products and keep Houston growing
with the rest of the country.
The boom years of the 1970s and early
1980s seemed at the time to be just one more
chapter in Houston’s history of economic suc-
cess. But in retrospect, the city’s fabulous
growth during these years was based on over-
heated oil and real estate markets that left it
poised for a fall. By 1982, it was apparent that
the world was not on the verge of running out
of oil, that non-OPEC oil supplies were grow-
ing faster than expected and that OPEC was
losing its grip on $40 per barrel oil. As prices
plunged between 1982 and 1986, reaching a
low near $10 per barrel in 1985, the Houston
economy plummeted as well.
During five years of economic collapse
between March 1982 and March 1987, Houston
lost 212,000 jobs, or 13.4 percent of its total
employment. Jobs tied directly to the oil
extraction industry accounted for 113,000 lost
jobs, with 61.3 percent of these losses in oil
and gas production and services and the rest in
associated oil field machinery. The oil bust
spread to the city’s real estate market, where
the value of office buildings, shopping centers,
apartments and single-family homes collapsed.
A wave of failures and mergers devastated the
Texas banking system, including many of
Houston’s largest banks. 
The positive part of the story was yet to
come, however. All the jobs lost to the oil bust
returned to the city by May 1990, only three
years after Houston’s economy hit bottom.
Where did these 70,000 new jobs per year
come from? They came from many sources:
from a strong U.S. and global economy work-
ing as a backdrop to Houston’s own growth;
from rapidly expanding medical and health
care employment; from the decision to build
an American space station and expand Hous-
ton’s Johnson Space Center; from stabilization
of the U.S. oil extraction industry and its con-
solidation into Houston; and from a construc-
tion boom in Houston’s giant petrochemical
and refining complex.
Houston’s useful lessons from the oil bust
itself were scarce, beyond the opportunity to
see firsthand the financial and human wreck-
age left in the wake of a boom built on infla-
tion and unbridled speculation. In contrast, the
lessons from Houston’s economic recovery
yield insight into the city’s true economic
strengths—its resilience, diversity and com-
plexity—and how a healthier and profitable oil
industry has provided a firm foundation for the
city’s future growth and diversification. 
MORE THAN OIL? 
The most important jobs in any city are
those in its economic base. These are jobs
associated with the sale of goods and services
to other towns, cities or nations. Houston’s
exports to other regions (such as refined oil,
chemicals, oil services) pay for imports from
other cities (autos from Detroit, movies from
2Hollywood). They also pay for local activities,
such as laundries, grocery stores and TV repair.
Economists estimate that 50 percent or more of
Houston’s economic base is still tied to the oil
industry, and the remainder is now widely
divided among other industries.
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The non-oil part of Houston’s economy
contains two focal points that were critical to
Houston’s recovery from the oil bust: the Texas
Medical Center and the Johnson Space Center.
In 1997 the vast Texas Medical Center
employed 49,000 people, and its annual oper-
ating budget of $4.1 billion coordinated health
care, education and research in more than 30
affiliated institutions. Some 18,500 students
were enrolled on its campuses, and member
institutions spent over $425 million on research
activities. Spending for new construction at the
Texas Medical Center is currently programmed
at $740 million over the next two years, bring-
ing online 3.1 million square feet of new
space. Health care employment throughout the
Houston metro area has risen by 39,000 since
1987.
Similarly crucial to Houston’s economic
turnaround was the 1984 Reagan administra-
tion decision to build an American space 
station. Houston’s Johnson Space Center is
headquarters for U.S. manned space flight,
with its chief role that of managing the space
shuttle program. By the early 1990s, the Amer-
ican space station had become an international
effort, but the Johnson Space Center’s desig-
nation as the host laboratory brought an 
additional $189 million in new funding and
4,400 new jobs to Houston. By 1995, these jobs
were an integral part of the space center’s
3,300 workers, along with the 11,000 local
aerospace workers supported directly by NASA
contracts. 
Also on the nonpetroleum side of Hous-
ton’s economy are the 13,000 Houston-based
employees of Compaq Computer Corp., whose
headquarters and operations are centered in
Houston. A number of the largest U.S. envi-
ronmental and waste management companies
are headquartered in Houston (Browning-Fer-
ris Industries, Waste Management) to tap the
city’s reservoir of engineering talent. Likewise,
companies as large and diverse as American
General Life Insurance ($10.3 billion in annual
revenue), Continental Airlines ($8 billion) and
food distributor Sysco ($15.3 billion) call Hous-
ton home.
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STABILITY AND PROFITS UPSTREAM 
On the other side of the oil bust, Houston
has again emerged as the dominant American
center for oil and natural gas exploration,
drilling, production and marketing. This
upstream industry scrambled for survival as its
U.S. employment fell by half during the oil
bust, and through the following decade it
struggled with overcapacity, low energy prices
and a wrenching effort to do the bulk of its
business overseas. What has emerged in recent
years is an American oil industry focused on
productivity and profits, driven by new tech-
nology and competing formidably in interna-
tional markets.
Houston’s dominance of the American oil
industry shows up in more than 56,000
upstream jobs. As Table 1 shows, this is nearly
four times the oil employment of Dallas, its
nearest competitor. Houston dominates in the
headquarters and producer sectors, where the
industry’s key decisions are made. As overall
industry employment shrank by 27.3 percent
after 1987, Houston was the only city to gain
upstream oil jobs.
Why does the industry flock to Houston?
Partly because of the decline of U.S. domestic
oil fields, as the onshore United States is
increasingly seen as drilled out. A producer or
service operator that in the past operated in a
single basin now finds fewer opportunities. To
keep the company viable or make it grow, it
Table 1
Upstream Oil Employment, 1996 
U.S. cities ranked by number of oil jobs
City Total Headquarters Producers
Houston 56,147 21,667 10,892
Dallas 14,377 6,671 3,552
Midland 10,063 2,062 2,542
Lafayette 9,388 750 833
New Orleans 8,887 2,045 2,407
Tulsa 8,716 3,750 2,730
Oklahoma City 7,636 1,810 2,709
Denver 6,692 3,153 2,216
Bakersfield 5,157 1,158 403
Fort Worth 5,106 1,681 1,766
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Commerce, County Business Patterns; author’s calculations.
3must find work elsewhere. Cities such as Hous-
ton, Dallas and New Orleans—with long-
standing ties to services and producers
operating in many regions—offer a better cen-
tral point from which to organize work in mul-
tiple basins. 
The industry’s consolidation into Houston
was driven partly by recent advances in tech-
nology that have brought substantial cost sav-
ings. Important new tools, such as
three-dimensional seismic, coiled tubing and
measurement-while-drilling, have lowered
costs, reduced the risk of each prospect and
broadened the range of exploration opportuni-
ties open to the industry. Houston sits at the
forefront of this technology; companies locate
there so they can plug into cutting-edge activ-
ity and be part of the industry’s knowledge
loop. Among the companies operating
research and development laboratories in
Houston are Exxon, Shell, Texaco, Chevron,
Pennzoil, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger. To
adequately participate or even monitor this
research, a company needs to be in Houston to
attend meetings for the technical small talk and
gossip and to keep an eye on competitors’
products. 
Houston’s sheer size as a center for oil
activity means its labor force offers potential
employers a wide range of skilled employees
from whom to choose. These employees, in
turn, like Houston because they have a choice
of employers. Similarly, specialized oil industry
suppliers and investment bankers choose
Houston because most of their customers are
already there. Consolidation is cumulative—a
self-fulfilling process of centralizing all the
important pieces of the oil industry in one
place. The same principles, of course, are what
draw moviemakers to Hollywood, financial
service providers to New York and automakers
to Detroit. 
REFINING AND PETROCHEMICALS
When oil is mentioned—and indeed when
Houston is mentioned—it is exploration and
drilling that first come to mind. However,
Houston is also a key center for research, tech-
nology and operation of downstream oil. This
is the more routine business of processing oil
in refineries and petrochemical plants, turning
crude oil and natural gas liquids into final
products. A refinery produces energy products,
such as gasoline, kerosene or jet fuel, while the
petrochemical plant turns oil and natural gas
liquids into intermediate products, such as eth-
ylene or propylene, that ultimately become
one of thousands of plastic or synthetic rubber
products, such as pipes, packaging, synthetic
fibers or auto parts. 
Houston stands at the center of the Texas
and Louisiana refining and petrochemical com-
plex, the largest such complex in the world
and the dominant industrial feature of Texas
and Louisiana coastal cities. Refineries and
chemical plants sprawl for 52 miles along the
Houston Ship Channel, from Houston to the
smaller nearby cities of Pasadena, Deer Park
and La Marque. Dozens more plants lie just to
the north and south of the Ship Channel
entrance on Galveston Bay—at Freeport, Mont
Belvieu, Baytown and Texas City. The scene is
repeated at city after city on the Gulf of Mex-
ico, from ports at New Orleans, Baton Rouge
and Lake Charles in Louisiana to Beaumont,
Port Arthur, Houston, Brazoria, Victoria and
Corpus Christi. 
The Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast is
home to 38 refineries that process 5.8 million
barrels of crude oil per day and comprise 37.9
percent of U.S. refining capacity. Ten refineries
in the immediate Houston area process 2.1 mil-
lion barrels per day. These companies include
industry giants such as Amoco’s Texas City
plant, Exxon’s Baytown refinery and Shell’s
sophisticated Deer Park facility. Another mil-
lion barrels per day are processed in four
refineries in the nearby cities of Beaumont and
Port Arthur.
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With 354 chemical facilities, the Houston
metropolitan area is the major U.S. producer of
commodity petrochemicals such as benzene,
ethylene, propylene and xylene. Ethylene is
the largest petrochemical building block in
terms of volume; it is often found in packaging
products such as milk cartons and plastic bags.
A recent survey of large ethylene plants found
31 of the 37 U.S. plants located on the Texas
and Louisiana Gulf Coast. Together, these facil-
ities produce 23.6 million pounds per year,
accounting for 92.2 percent of U.S. capacity
and 26 percent of global capacity. The imme-
diate Houston vicinity is home to 13 major eth-
ylene plants, or 48.5 percent of U.S. capacity.
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Across all classes of commodity petrochemi-
cals, Houston averages 45 percent of U.S.
capacity.
Direct employment in refining, chemicals
4and plastics in Houston totals about 50,000, but
these jobs only begin to describe the economic
impact of this downstream complex. For exam-
ple, in 1998 the port of Houston ranked eighth
in the world in total tonnage handled and first
among U.S. ports in foreign tonnage. Hous-
ton’s port can best be viewed as an essential
part of the regional downstream oil industry.
Of the port’s 107.8 million tons of foreign ship-
ments, 77.2 percent moved through the petro-
chemical complex as crude oil, oil products,
organic chemicals, polymers, plastics and fer-
tilizers. Other related downstream infrastruc-
ture includes air separation plants, storage
terminals, salt domes and transportation facili-
ties. Several thousand miles of privately oper-
ated pipelines, known as the Spaghetti Bowl,
shuttle dozens of products among 200 different
chemical plants and refineries.
Perhaps the largest indirect impact of refin-
ing and petrochemicals comes through con-
struction. New capacity needs for expansion,
growing infrastructure, environmental controls
and plant maintenance give rise to ongoing
construction. Over the past 25 years, the 11
port cities on the Texas and Louisiana Gulf
Coast have averaged construction employment
40 percent higher than their inland counter-
parts in these same states. This is after we
account for differences in population and
growth rates, meaning that the downstream oil
industry is probably largely responsible for the
higher Gulf Coast construction activity.
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Petrochemical construction has been a
springboard for many Houston-based compa-
nies to develop an important role in interna-
tional construction. Houston is home to almost
all the nation’s international construction com-
panies that have or seek a niche in continuous
process industrial plants for oil refining, chem-
icals and fertilizers. These construction skills,
learned and still practiced by companies on the
Houston Ship Channel, are now applied
around the world. Table 2 lists the nine largest
engineering operations in Houston, with their
numbers of engineers and employees. Bechtel,
Fluor Daniel and Jacobs Engineering lead a
contingent of California-based companies with
a large Houston presence. 
Downstream oil, especially petrochemicals,
played a key role in Houston’s recovery from
the oil bust. Unlike in the upstream oil indus-
try, high oil and natural gas prices are a liabil-
ity, raising the cost of basic feedstock and the
price of final products. During the boom years
of the 1970s and early 1980s, many U.S. petro-
chemical plants were closed permanently or to
await lower oil and natural gas feedstock
prices to improve plant economics. Then, in
the mid-1980s, energy feedstock prices fell
through the floor. Tight chemical capacity and
a global economic boom combined with low
energy prices to create huge industry profits.
The result was massive global expansion of the
petrochemical industry, and in 1990 alone
$10.8 billion was spent for new or expanded
chemical facilities on the Texas Gulf Coast. 
Figure 1 shows new petrochemical project
announcements in Texas and Louisiana in the
late 1980s and 1990s. This expansion sharply
increased Houston’s construction employment;
Table 2
Largest Houston Engineering Firms
Company Licensed engineers Houston employees
Halliburton 749 16,668
Bechtel 441 2,100
Fluor Daniel 293 2,721
Jacobs Engineering 238 1,475
CDI Engineering 175 1,150
Parsons 155 813
S&B Engineers 147 1,245
Stone & Webster 125 600
ABB Lummus 100 1,000
SOURCE:  Houston Business Journal, 2000 Book of Lists.
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5spurred local manufacturing of compressors,
valves and instruments; and enabled Houston-
based engineering companies to share in tens
of billions of dollars in domestic and interna-
tional construction projects.
OIL AND THE LOCAL BUSINESS CYCLE
The discussion above suggests that the role
of oil in Houston in the 1990s differs from that
in the 1980s. First, there is a better balance
between the upstream and downstream oil
sectors. The improved balance stems in part
from the decline of oil production and oil ser-
vices caused by the speculative excesses of 
the 1980s and a return to lower, sustainable
long-run upstream employment levels. And it
derives from the revival of downstream opera-
tions spurred by the end of the inflated oil
prices. 
The presence of both upstream and down-
stream oil business in Houston provides stabil-
ity that other oil cities such as Midland, Tulsa
and Lafayette cannot count on.
6 High oil and
natural gas prices excite producers and spur
activity upstream. Conversely, high oil prices
increase the cost of doing business down-
stream; they eat into profits, reduce cash flow
and discourage investment and capital spend-
ing. Low oil prices have the opposite effect,
dampening upstream activity but stimulating
downstream business.
The combination of upstream and down-
stream operations worked for decades to shel-
ter and to balance the profits of integrated oil
companies. We can think of Houston as the
Exxon or Shell of oil cities, with employment
and income balanced in much the same way
large oil companies maintain profits through
periods of high and low oil prices. Midland
and Tulsa, in contrast, are independent pro-
ducers, depending mostly on the upstream. 
Second, the consolidation of oil producer
and headquarters operations into the city offers
more short-term stability. In the hierarchy of
layoff decisions made in response to falling oil
prices, producing regions such as the Permian
Basin or the Mid-Continent fields (and thus
cities such a Midland and Tulsa) will feel the
pinch of unemployment first. In contrast, head-
quarters and research facilities stand relatively
protected. These overhead operations are vul-
nerable to contraction as consolidation occurs
within the industry, but the reductions are the
result of longer term trends rather than short-
run, oil-price-driven decisions. And in the
long-run consolidation process, Houston has
held on to its operations far better than com-
petitor cities. 
But as we consider Houston’s vulnerability
to an oil downturn, and particularly if we com-
pare the 1980s to the 1990s, the biggest differ-
ence has been the oil industry’s view of itself.
In the 1980s, the oil industry saw itself as
draining the last of a globally limited resource,
the price of which would continue rising for
decades. The cost of finding oil mattered less
than the simple fact of finding a scarce deposit.
Profits were so large they generated a bullet-
proof mentality. 
That part of the oil industry that survived
into the 1990s quickly recognized it was in a
commodity-driven business, part of the boom-
and-bust cycle that inevitably drives such mar-
kets. Survivors understood cost saving, and
they learned to use technology and consolida-
tion to cut unnecessary fat. In the short term,
companies had to be able to quickly ratchet
their size upward and downward, relying on
temporary employees and outsourcing. Hiring
was done reluctantly, and layoffs became rou-
tine.
The oil industry of the 1980s was too fat
and too self-satisfied to see even the potential
for a downfall, making the ultimate descent of
huge proportions. The industry that survived
into the 1990s was lean and perpetually braced
for the worst as it responded to every nuance
of oil markets. Houston’s vulnerability to sub-
stantial decline in the 1980s was based on a
bubble in world oil markets rather than a fun-
damental flaw in the local economy. Houston’s
vulnerability to oil markets was greatly
reduced after the bubble burst. 
HOUSTON AND OIL IN THE 1990S
The 1990s have seen two significant down-
turns in the local oil industry. The first came in
1991–92, when oil prices fell sharply following
the Persian Gulf War. Concurrently, a very
warm winter briefly pushed down the price of
natural gas to near $1 per thousand cubic feet,
less than half the price needed to provide an
incentive to drill. By the first quarter of 1992,
the cumulative drop in the domestic rig count
over the prior year was 31.8 percent. By the
fourth quarter, the decline in local oil and nat-
ural gas extraction had reached 7 percent over
the prior year.
6The most recent downturn, in 1998–99,
was a product of the Asian financial crisis and
part of the general decline in global commod-
ity prices that followed. By first quarter 1999,
the domestic rig count reached a four-quarter
decline of 43.1 percent, and two quarters later
Houston oil producer and oil service employ-
ment hit a year-long decline of 12.1 percent.
Figure 2 summarizes four-quarter percent
changes in the domestic rig count and in Hous-
ton oil service and producer employment,
computed from 1976 to the present.
So how does a downturn in domestic oil
extraction (here measured by the rig count)
affect Houston oil extraction employment?
Table 3 summarizes some of the largest and
most significant changes in the domestic rig
count and in Houston producer and oil service
employment. In the 1980s, for example, the
biggest decline in the domestic rig count mea-
sured over a four-quarter period came in third
quarter 1986, with a 62.7 percent decline. One
quarter later, Houston registered its biggest
four-quarter fall in oil extraction jobs, 23.6 per-
cent. As a summary statistic of how the rig
count affects oil jobs, we can compute an
implied elasticity of 0.376, defined as the per-
cent change in Houston oil jobs for a 1 percent
change in the domestic rig count. 
We can perform similar calculations for the
two 1990s downturns. The result is a decline in
the elasticity of Houston oil service and pro-
ducer jobs from 0.376 in 1986 to 0.22 in
1991–92 to 0.281 in 1998–99. In other words,
thanks to consolidation, technology and a
more conservative management approach,
Houston oil jobs in the 1990s are 25 percent to
33 percent less responsive to movements in the
domestic rig count than in the 1980s. 
The lower half of Table 3 shows the same
calculations, but for increases in Houston oil
and gas employment in response to rig count
increases. By late 1981, for example, oil extrac-
tion jobs were rising at a 26.5 percent annual
rate in response to 1980 annual rig count
changes that ran as high as 42.3 percent. The
implied elasticity is 0.626. In the 1990s, Hous-
ton oil companies were not nearly so anxious
to hire; a 1 percent increase in the rig count led
to job increases of 0.264 in 1990–91 and 0.281
percent in 1997–98. The lack of symmetry in
the 1981 and 1986 elasticities may simply
reflect the overheated oil market of the 1980s
and companies’ overwillingness to jump into
new exploration projects. The upside elastici-
ties in the 1990s, however, are similar to those
computed for the downside in the top of Table
3, with job growth showing less fluctuation in
response to rig count.
ANOTHER APPROACH
When we make more sophisticated esti-
mates of these elasticities, isolating oil market
changes from simultaneous movements in
other factors such as the U.S. economy or the
trade-weighted value of the dollar, the bottom-
line results remain remarkably similar to the
back-of-the-envelope calculations in Table 3.
The new estimates also show a change in
Houston oil employment of about 0.4 percent
for each percentage point change in the
domestic rig count in the 1980s, with a signifi-
cant decline of about one-third in this response
in the 1990s. 
Figure 2
Houston Oil Jobs and Rig Count
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Table 3
Biggest Changes in Rig Count and Houston Oil Employment
(Four-quarter percent change)
Time period Rigs Jobs Implied elasticity
Declines in activity
1986 –62.7 –23.6 .376
1991–92 –31.8 –7.0 .220
1998–99 –43.1 –12.1 .281
Increases in activity
1980–81 42.3 26.5 .626
1990–91 24.2 6.4 .264
1997–98 24.9 7.0 .281
NOTE: All coefficients are statistically significant with a high level of confidence.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
7To get these estimates, we assume that
Houston’s mining (oil services and producers)
and manufacturing employment is determined
by three major factors: the domestic rig count,
the strength of the U.S. economy as reflected
by the unemployment rate, and the real trade-
weighted value of the dollar. All variables are
quarterly from 1975 to 1999, seasonally
adjusted, with current and four lagged values
included for the rig count and the U.S. econ-
omy, and current and six lagged values
included for the value of the dollar. Also
included is a trend term to pick up other long-
term developments, a dummy variable that
divides the period into pre-1987 and post-1987,
and a variable to test if the role of oil in Hous-
ton is different before and after 1987.
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Table 4 summarizes the results, showing
the four- to six-quarter employment response
to a change in one of the causal variables. An
increase in the U.S. unemployment rate
increases mining employment in Houston, a
result of the countercyclical historical relation-
ship discussed above between oil and the U.S.
economy. The estimated elasticity between oil
and the U.S. economy is 0.135. For Houston
manufacturing, the relationship is such that an
improvement in the U.S. economy (a decline in
the unemployment rate) adds local jobs, both
in total manufacturing and for durable goods.
An increase in the trade-weighted value of
the dollar has a large negative impact on Hous-
ton mining and manufacturing. This is particu-
larly true in manufacturing, where a strong
dollar makes U.S. manufactured goods more
difficult to sell in foreign markets.
Finally, the estimated elasticities for local
mining and manufacturing employment in
response to a change in the rig count are 0.43,
0.32 and 0.49 for pre-1987 mining, manufactur-
ing and durable goods, respectively. The fig-
ures fall after 1987 to 0.29, 0.2 and 0.32. For
mining, the figures are broadly similar to the
estimates in Table 3, in both the overall mag-
nitude and the extent of the decline after 1987.
The estimates in Table 4 also indicate that the
differences before and after 1987 are highly
statistically significant, with swings in Houston
oil jobs becoming much smoother relative to
rig count changes after 1987.
8 After 1987, oil
markets affect Houston’s oil industry much dif-
ferently.
THE BROADER ECONOMY
How does change in oil extraction employ-
ment affect the broader Houston economy? Is
a shift in oil-related employment now less
meaningful to sectors such as construction,
retail trade and services? Estimates of these
relationships, shown in Table 5, tell us that oil
extraction is still the dominant force in Hous-
ton. Oil’s impact on the local economy has
changed over time, but the effects of this
change remain small and subtle.
To relate oil to other sectors of the local
economy, the oil measure we choose is the
sum of oil and gas mining plus manufacturing
employment. Along with oil, local economic
sectors are assumed to respond to changes in
the national economy, represented once more
by the U.S. unemployment rate. Diversification
away from oil might be indicated by a bigger
impact of the U.S. economy on Houston. The
estimates are made before and after 1987,
using current and four lagged values of both
variables.
Table 4
Elasticity of Houston Mining and Manufacturing Jobs
Manufacturing
Mining All sectors Durables
U.S. unemployment rate .135 –.148 –.274
Trade-weighted dollar –.305 –.842 –1.163
Rig count
Pre-1987 .434 .316 .490
Post-1987 .290 .202 .321
NOTE: All coefficients are statistically significant with a high level of confidence.
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Table 5
Effect of Changes in Mining and Manufacturing 
on Broader Houston Economy
Mining and U.S.
manufacturing jobs economy
Before After Before After
Sector 1987 1987 1987 1987
Construction 1.02 .863 –.104 –.310
TCPU .553 .591 –.117 –.176
Retail trade .231 .025 –.050 –.076
Wholesale trade .654 .569 –.145 –.173
FIRE and services .236 .194 –.003 –.115
NOTE: Bold italicized coefficients are statistically significant with a high level of 
confidence. TCPU, transportation, communications and public utilities; 
FIRE, finance, insurance and real estate.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.We estimate the effect of oil on employ-
ment in five sectors: construction; transporta-
tion, communications and public utilities
(TCPU); retail trade; wholesale trade; and a
combination of finance, insurance and real
estate (FIRE), personal and business services.
The coefficients shown in Table 5 are the elas-
ticity of each sector’s employment with respect
to mining and manufacturing jobs or to the
U.S. unemployment rate.
While the coefficients suggest that some
structural change has occurred in Houston, the
change has not been dramatic. For example,
the coefficients measuring the influence of
local mining and manufacturing jobs were
quite large and highly significant in every sec-
tor before 1987. Although the coefficients are
somewhat smaller after 1987 (TCPU being the
exception), the only decline in the value of a
coefficient that was statistically significant was
in retail trade. Outside of retail trade, we are
left only with the suggestion that a structural
shift away from oil might be under way, but
we have little firm evidence.
According to Table 5, TCPU and wholesale
trade employment were subject to significant
influence by the U.S. economy prior to 1987.
This influence persisted after 1987, but did not
grow. The very large FIRE and services sector
is the only industry to develop sensitivity to
U.S. economic conditions after 1987, a sensitiv-
ity that did not previously exist. Again, it is at
the margin that we see structural change under
way, with the influence of the U.S. economy
developing slowly. 
ADDING IT UP
Figure 3 adds up all sectors and shows total
employment in Houston from 1976 through
November 1999. The job losses of the oil bust,
following the 1982 peak, are the only signifi-
cant declines on the chart. Neither of this
decade’s oil downturns actually caused overall
job losses. In 1991–92, job growth stopped for
a significant period; the downturn in oil was
sufficient to halt the powerful recovery. In
1990, local job growth reached 6 percent, the
best in this decade for Houston; but by 1992,
problems in the oil patch reduced local job
growth to zero. 
We also see a brief pause in local job
growth in 1999. Revised job growth figures
now show Houston employment grew only 0.9
percent in the first 11 months, after a first quar-
ter of no job growth at all. Again, rapid growth
came to an abrupt halt, but with no overall job
losses for all of 1999. 
How do we explain the contrast between
the 1980s and the 1990s, as shown in Figure 3,
in how a setback in oil markets affects Hous-
ton? The oil industry has significantly changed
the way it hires and fires in the 1990s, with
fluctuations in local oil employment in
response to a change in drilling activity
reduced by perhaps one-third. As previously
stated, this is the product of industry consoli-
dation, new technology and better manage-
ment.
Also, at the margin, we see modest struc-
tural change in the way oil affects other, sec-
ondary sectors in the city. There is evidence
that the role of oil is moderately diminished
and the role of the U.S. economy is slowly
growing. But oil still counts here, and the basic
transmission mechanism running from oil
shock to local economic shock remains firmly
in place. 
Why, then, do we find in the 1980s the loss
of 200,000 local jobs and in the 1990s, a sim-
ple pause in economic growth? We have to
return to the psychology of the times and to
the speculative fever that formerly gripped the
oil industry. It was a fever that spread to the
local economy as well. If you could not run a
drilling rig, one shortcut to oil riches was to
invest in Houston real estate. The domino
effect moved from oil to real estate, from real
estate to local banks and from banks to local
businesses as credit was cut off. 
Figure 3
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SOURCE: Texas Workforce Commission.
9ton have come from within the oil industry
itself. 
Perhaps Houston’s biggest problem in the
1980s was not the structure of the local econ-
omy but the perverse nature and magnitude of
the oil boom itself. In the 1990s, Houston twice
experienced economic setbacks due to serious
problems in world oil markets but never suf-
If this reasoning is right—if we can look at
the oil bust as a one-time event—it is funda-
mentally good news for Houston. The city has
diligently pursued industrial diversification as
an economic goal, although success in this
effort remains hard to identify in the aggregate
numbers. Indeed, our figures indicate that the
biggest changes in the influence of oil in Hous-
The equations and estimated elastici-
ties used in this article to explore the
evolving role of oil in Houston’s econ-
omy can also be used to forecast jobs for
the coming year. Such a forecast provides
another illustration of how potent oil
remains in the local economy. The
accompanying table shows our estimates
of private employment in Houston in
1999 and 2000 by industry sector. The
difference in overall performance
between 1999 and 2000—0.4 percent
growth versus 3.9 percent—is largely
attributable to the ongoing rebound in oil
markets.
As final data for the first two quarters
of 1999 have become available, they
have shown sharp downward revisions
for Houston. Although the U.S. economy
ran at very high levels in 1999 and global
markets stabilized, the turnaround in oil
markets came too late to salvage a good
year of job growth in Houston. Our best
estimate for overall local job growth
remains in the 0 to 1 percent range.
The dramatic improvement in the out-
look for 2000 is primarily because the
current improved oil outlook is beginning
to create jobs in Houston. Our forecast
for 2000, as reflected in the table,
assumes a modest slowdown in the U.S.
economy but with continued tight labor
markets. We assume the trade-weighted
exchange rate for the dollar will be stable
at current levels throughout the year and,
in response to higher oil and natural gas
prices, the domestic rig count will rise to
an average of 825 in the first quarter and
remain there throughout the year.
The result of these assumptions,
which are close to the conditions at
which we ended 1999, is a dramatic
improvement in the local economy in
2000. Instead of the 7,500 jobs added in
1999, the increase in private employment
should be nearly 70,000, or 3.9 percent.
Big gains in oil and gas mining and
durable manufacturing lead the expan-
sion, although construction slows sharply
in a lagged response to the slow growth
of 1999.
Remember the assumptions: good
U.S. economic performance, a stable
exchange rate and strong oil markets. Of
these, the chief threat to the scenario,
both in risk and impact on Houston, is a
setback in oil markets. If the scenario
materializes, however, it will be a replay
of the excellent backdrop that brought
Houston strong job growth in 1997–98.
Employment Growth in Houston, 1999 and 2000
Percent increase by sector
1999 2000







Wholesale trade .2 2.1
Retail trade 3.6 1.4
FIRE + services 1.2 5.1
NOTE: TCPU, transportation, communications and public utilities; FIRE, finance,
insurance and real estate.
SOURCE: Author‘s calculations. 
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10fered significant overall job losses. The main
economic lesson for Houston from the 1990s is
that oil has been largely tamed. Oil still counts,
and oil can still hurt us or help us. But we can
stop looking over our shoulder waiting for the
oil bust to return. 
—Bill Gilmer
Senior economist and 
assistant vice president
NOTES
1 For example, in July 1998 the University of Houston’s
Center for Public Policy, in its DATABook Houston, set
the figure at 51.7 percent. Various rule-of-thumb calcula-
tions suggest this is a conservative estimate. See, for
example, “Diversification of Houston Industry,” Houston
Business, October 1991.
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2 Houston Business Journal, 2000 Book of Lists. 
3 Data are from Oil and Gas Journal, December 21, 1998,
pp. 85–91.
4 Data are from Oil and Gas Journal, March 23, 1999, 
p. 61.
5 The February, April and May 1994 issues of Houston
Business discuss the history, role and economic impacts
of the downstream industries on the Texas and
Louisiana Gulf Coast.
6 The other significant oil city that shares this combina-
tion is New Orleans.
7 These equations have been used and better described
in several past issues of Houston Business. See, for
example, “Houston and the National Business Cycle,”
July 1993, or “The Dollar Exchange Rate and the Hous-
ton Economy,” September 1997.
8 It can also be said that Houston jobs have smoothed out
relative to oil price swings. If real oil prices are used in
place of the domestic rig count, the results are very sim-
ilar.
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Revised Texas and Houston employ-
ment data indicate a much weaker 1999 than
previously announced. The Texas Workforce
Commission will not release its benchmark
revisions for nonagricultural employment until
February, but it now appears that for the
period from December 1998 through Novem-
ber 1999, statewide employment may be
revised downward from 2.2 percent to 1.7
percent. The downward revision in Houston’s
data—from 2.3 percent to only 0.9 percent—
should be among the largest of the Texas
metro areas. These historical revisions fall in
line with expectations of slower growth 
following the Asian economic crisis and an 
oil price collapse. But any weakness now
seems to be well behind us, as current fun-
damentals and future prospects for Houston
look very strong. 
RETAIL SALES 
The holiday season started slowly but
gained steam after Thanksgiving. Many retail-
ers—especially discounters—recorded excel-
lent percentage gains over 1998 sales. But
weak apparel sales hurt many other stores, as
unseasonably warm weather left winter cloth-
ing on the shelves. Retailers will need to
advertise heavily and offer bargain prices to
move the inventory before spring. 
OIL SERVICES AND MACHINERY
The oil services sector reported steady
production gains and indications that the 
industry in the United States and Canada is
hiring again. Product prices have not im-
proved significantly, except for modest
increases in day rates for offshore rigs and
supply boats. Until recently, the industry com-
plained that the improvement in the rig count
was concentrated in work that required few
resources—shallow, onshore, domestic and
vertical. There are now signs that the quality
of domestic work has begun to improve,
especially the depth of wells, and that pros-
pects for international work look more
promising. 
REFINING AND PETROCHEMICALS
Rising crude oil prices in November and
December were not passed through to cus-
tomers, and refining margins remain poor.
Gasoline demand was weaker than normal for
the holidays, perhaps because of limited
travel over the Y2K weekend; supplies were
more than ample, as distributors had made
significant efforts to ensure storage tanks were
full. Refinery capacity utilization held steady
through the New Year but may weaken in the
weeks ahead with high inventories and the
prospect of continued poor refining margins. 
A series of chemical price increases last
fall raised hopes that petrochemicals had
turned the corner and that profit margins
might begin to rebuild after large increases in
oil and natural gas feedstock prices. However,
rising feedstock costs in November and
December wiped out all the profit gains, and
expectations for the coming year are again
bleak. Profit margins for ethylene, propylene
and styrene are all below where they were at
this time last year. Chemical construction
activity along the Gulf Coast remains weak as
companies defer maintenance to reduce costs.
New project announcements plummeted in
1999. 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
January loan activity was slow, partly a
normal response to the season, but higher
interest rates are also thought to be playing a
role. December mortgage activity remained
strong, driven mostly by expectations of
higher interest rates. Commercial lending
slowed because of the higher rates and
because of reduced space needs in Houston
in a period of slower growth. Deposits rose
due to higher interest rates, year-end bonuses
and the return of Y2K cash hoards to banks.
No respondents reported significant Y2K-
related problems. 